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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Brandon Neil Crump appeals from his judgment of conviction for trafficking in
methamphetamine by attempted manufacturing, contending the district court abused its
discretion in denying his pre-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The state charged Crump with trafficking in methamphetamine by manufacturing
and felony injury to child. (R., pp.83-84.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Crump pied
guilty to a reduced charge of trafficking in methamphetamine by attempted
manufacturing. (9/19/2011 Tr., p.9, L.5-p.12, L.15; R., pp.90-91,102.) Pursuant to the
negotiations, the state agreed to dismiss the injury to child charge and "limit its
recommendation to 4 years max: 2 years fixed + 2 indeterminate." (9/19/2011 Tr., p.12,
L.22 - p.15, L.3; R., p.103.) The district court accepted Grump's plea to count one of
the amended information, dismissed the injury to child charge with prejudice, released
Crump from custody as part of the negotiated deal, ordered a presentence investigation
report, and set the matter for sentencing. (9/19/2011 Tr., p.16, L.6 - p.19, L.25.)
Crump filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing (R., p.130),
asserting in an accompanying memorandum in support of his motion that he was never
advised of his right to challenge the search warrant in his case and as such he should
be allowed to withdraw his plea (R., p.133-135).

Although Grump's original

memorandum in support of his motion to withdraw his plea acknowledged Crump "pied
guilty to a serious felony charge with a mandatory minimum sentence" (R., p.135), he
filed a supplemental motion to withdraw his plea asserting the plea agreement between
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himself and the state "create[d] the illusion that the court [was] not required by the plea
to enter a 2 year term with a mandatory 2 year sentence" (R., p.149).
Following a hearing on the motion to withdraw Grump's guilty plea where the only
issue addressed was Grump's assertion that he was not properly advised there was a
mandatory minimum two year sentence associated with the amended charge he was
pleading guilty to, the district court denied the motion, finding:
Now, Mr. Crump testified that he knew that he was ineligible for a
retained jurisdiction. He testified that he knew that he was facing a fixed
term in prison of two years by agreeing to the amended plea agreement.
So instead of facing five years in prison as a minimum, he was facing two
years in prison as a minimum.
(3/08/2012 Tr., p.55, Ls.13-19.) The court then went on to find that the state would be
prejudiced by allowing Crump to withdraw his plea of guilty:
In this case, there was prejudice. There was prejudice to the state
by the fact that they dismissed one of the counts with prejudice. It does
appear from reviewing the transcript and being familiar with both of these
cases that this was a package deal, the package deal being that in order
for his wife to have her charge reduced to a possession charge and not be
charged with a crime that would require a mandatory minimum, Mr. Crump
would have to plead guilty. And that's what did happen. So the state has
been prejudiced first by the dismissal with prejudice of Count II, and that in
itself would be enough under these circumstances to deny the motion to
withdraw the plea of guilty.
In addition, the state was further prejudiced by the reduction of the
plea - the charge in Mrs. Grump's case.
(3/08/2012 Tr., p.56, Ls.4-22.)
The district court sentenced Crump to a unified sentence of four years with the
first two years fixed. (R., pp.168-171; 3/08/2012 Tr., p.69, Ls.4-7.) Crump filed a timely
notice of appeal. (R., pp.164-165.)
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ISSUE
Crump states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Grump's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea filed prior to sentencing?
(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Crump failed to establish an abuse of discretion in the denial of his presentencing motion for withdrawal of his guilty plea?
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ARGUMENT
Crump Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying His
Pre-Sentencing Motion For Withdrawal Of His Guilty Plea

A.

Introduction
Crump contends the district court abused its discretion in denying his pre-

sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-9.) He alleges
that prior to his guilty plea he did not understand "that he was facing a mandatory
minimum sentence of two years by pleading guilty to attempted trafficking in
methamphetamine." (Appellant's brief, p.6.) The record, however, supports the district
court's determination that Crump failed to demonstrate a just reason entitling him to
withdraw his guilty plea. Crump has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to

whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished from
arbitrary action." State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536, 211 P.3d 775, 780-781
(Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 362, 941 P.2d 330, 334 (Ct.
App. 1997)). An appellate court will defer to the trial court's factual findings if they are
supported by substantial competent evidence. State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 15 P.3d
1167 (2000); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254,869 P.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1994).

C.

Standards Applicable To A Motion To Withdraw A Guilty Plea
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is governed by I.C.R. 33(c), which provides:
(c) Withdrawal of plea of guilty. A motion to withdraw a plea of
guilty may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of
sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after
4

sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the
defendant to withdraw defendant's plea.
Although a district court's discretion should be "liberally exercised" when ruling
on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea made prior to the pronouncement of sentence,
withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an automatic right. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211
P.3d at 780.
(1990).

See also State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281, 284

Rather, "the defendant has the burden of showing a 'just reason' exists to

withdraw the plea." Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780 (citations omitted).
Failure to present and support a just or plausible reason, even absent prejudice to the
prosecution, will weigh against granting withdrawal.

State v. Mayer, 139 Idaho 643,

647, 84 P.3d 579, 583 (Ct. App. 2004). "[T]he good faith, credibility, and weight of the
defendant's assertions in support of his motion to withdraw his plea are matters for the
trial court to decide." Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 537, 211 P.3d at 782 (citations omitted).
"The first step in analyzing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is to determine
whether the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made." Hanslovan, 147
Idaho at 536, 211 P.3d at 781 (citing State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959, 801 P.2d
1308, 1310 (Ct. App. 1990)). "If the plea is constitutionally valid, the court must then
determine whether there are any other just reasons for withdrawal of the plea."

D.

kl

Crump Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion In The Denial Of His Motion
To Withdraw His Guilty Plea
The district court, in denying Grump's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, found

the following:
I am familiar with the required standard on appeal examining this
type of decision that an appeal from the denial of such a motion to allow
the withdrawal of a guilty plea results in the burden being on the moving
5

party - in this case, Mr. Crump - to establish that there is a claimed abuse
of discretion.
I further recognize that in the proper exercise of discretion, the
Court is required to identify the conflicting factors which should bear on
the decision and must arrive at a resolution which is based on a wellreasoned consideration of the factors that have been identified.
So what do we have in this situation? We have Mr. Crump, who
entered a plea of guilty in front of Judge Reinhardt. This issue presented
initially - and I'll cover that - is, is there an agreement? Well, there is an
agreement. It's a written - it's an agreement that appears to me to be
written, but the agreement does appear to be ambiguous, at least in
certain respects.
If there is an ambiguity, which there appears to be, that ambiguity
can be clarified by what I'm going to characterize as parts of the oral
agreement.
Now, Mr. Crump testified that he knew that he was ineligible for a
retained jurisdiction. He testified that he knew that he was facing a fixed
term in prison of two years by agreeing to the amended plea agreement.
So instead of facing five years in prison as a minimum, he was facing two
years in prison as a minimum.
I could go ahead and simply state at this point that he did know
what he was getting into when he entered the plea of guilty. But even if he
did, in reviewing the law, even where a defendant -even if he had met his
burden on a motion to withdraw the plea, the state may avoid withdrawal
by demonstrating the existence of prejudice.
(3/08/12 Tr., p.54, L.11 - p.56, L.2.)

The district court correctly found Grump's guilty

plea was constitutionally valid based upon his affirmative statements to the court that he
understood the terms of the plea agreement and the maximum sentence the court could
impose. (3/08/2012 Tr., p.55, Ls.13-19.)

The district court further found Crump

understood his rights when he entered his plea. (3/08/2012 Tr., p.55, Ls.20-22.)
Crump asserts on appeal "that the district court's factual finding that he
understood the consequences of his guilty plea was not supported by substantial and
competent evidence."

(Appellant's brief, p.9.)
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The record in this case belies that

assertion. The pretrial settlement agreement containing the plea agreement pursuant to
which Crump pied guilty included the language that the state would amend the charge
of trafficking in methamphetamine, carrying a sentence of "5 fixed - Life," to trafficking
in methamphetamine by attempted manufacture, carrying a sentence of "2 fixed - 15
years."

(R., p.103.)

The document, signed by Crump, clearly states the statutory

penalty for trafficking in methamphetamine by attempted manufacture as "2 (fixed) - 15
years/ $10,000 - $50,000." (Id.)
At the change of plea hearing, Crump indicated he understood that the maximum
sentence he could receive for pleading guilty to the amended charge was "a fixed two
followed by an indeterminate 13. So, two to 15." (9/19/2011 Tr., p.10, Ls.17-20.) At the
hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Crump conceded he understood prior
to pleading guilty he would be serving a minimum of two years:

Q [by attorney for the state]:
Okay. And is it your testimony that she
[your attorney] never told you that this was a mandatory minimum prison
sentence case?
A [Crump]:

Um, can you repeat that again, please?

Q:
Are you telling us that she never once told you that you were
looking at a mandatory minimum prison sentence?
A;
me.

She said that I was not eligible for a Rider. That's what she told

Q:

Okay. What did she talk to you about the prison sentence?

A:

Nothing.

Q:

Okay. So she told you, though, you're not eligible for a Rider?

Q:
So if your attorney tells you you are not eligible for a retained
jurisdiction, why is it you're here today saying that you thought you were?
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A;
Because when I looked at the plea agreement that I signed - that I
was signing, that it didn't say that on there.
Q:

It didn't say what?

A:

That is was a mandatory minimum.

Q:

Okay. What does "two years fixed" mean to you, sir?

MR. PHELPS [defense counsel]: Judge, could he have a copy of
the agreement?
THE COURT:

Well, I want to hear him answer the question.

THE DEFENDANT: Two years fixed? That means I would do two
years.
BY MR. GREENBANK [attorney for the state]:
Q:
Okay. No confusion. Right?

A:

Mm-hmm.

Q:
And when the Judge talked to you at your sentencing hearing or at
your plea hearing, he covered that several times. Right?

MR. PHELPS:
speaks for itself.
THE COURT:

Your Honor, I'm going to object.

The record

I'll allow it. You can clear it up on redirect.

THE DEFENDANT: Can you repeat it now?
BY MR. GREENBANK:
Q:
At the time that you pied guilty to this offense A:

Mm-hmm.

Q:
-- the Judge covered the fact that it was a fixed two several times,
didn't he?

A:

Yeah.

Q:

You didn't express any confusion, did you?

A:

No.
8

(3/08/12 Tr., p.23, L.21 - p.26, L.3.)
The district court correctly determined that Crump understood he "was facing two
years in prison as a minimum." (3/08/2012 Tr., p.55, Ls.13-19.) As such, Crump has
failed to show the court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea.
The court further found that "even if [Crump] had met his burden" on the motion
to withdraw his plea, there was sufficient prejudice to the state to support a denial of the
motion. (3/08/2012 Tr., p.55, L.22 - p.56, L.24.) Crump states on appeal that he "is not
arguing that there was just reason for the district court to withdraw his guilty plea," he
just "did not understand the consequences of his guilty plea/ thus entitling him to
withdraw it. (Appellant's brie( p.8, n.2.) Having failed to show he did not understand
the potential penalties that could be imposed upon his guilty plea and having otherwise
failed to show his plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered, Crump
has failed to establish the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully
conviction for trafficking by attempted

/

to affirm Grump's judgment of
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